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The Relevance of the International Order to
the Internal Allocation of Powers to Use
Force
BERNARD H. OXMAN*
The United States attained its independence by winning a war
against a foreign power with the assistance of foreign allies. Many of the
nation's founders valued liberty even more than peace. Domestic tran-
quility and the common defense are tangible purposes of the "more per-
fect union" identified in the preamble to the Constitution they drafted a
few years later.'
That Constitution neither imposes nor suggests pacifism or isola-
tionism as the means to achieve its goals.2 The President's first enumer-
ated power is that of Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.3 The
Constitution expressly authorizes Congress to declare war, grant letters
of marque and reprisal, make rules concerning captures on land and
water,4 raise and support armies, 5 provide and maintain a navy,' provide
for calling forth the militia,7 make rules for the governance the army and
navy 8 and of the militia when in the service of the United States,9 and
define and punish piracies and other felonies on the high seas and other
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. America's early leaders understood the legal and political possibilities of a foreign policy
that included involvement in foreign alliances and wars. In urging the nation to avoid European
politics and entangling alliances, George Washington deemed such a foreign policy unwise, but
not illegal or impermissible.
Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our
peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or
caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the
foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be
understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the
maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs that honesty is always the
best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine
sense. But in my opinion it is unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in I MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 205, 215 (James D. Richardson ed., 1894).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
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offenses against the law of nations.'° The Constitution comprehensively
allocates foreign affairs and defense powers to the national government
and generally denies autonomy to the states in this regard. Still, even
without the consent of Congress, the states are precluded neither from
engaging in war if actually invaded or in such imminent danger as will
not admit of delay, nor from keeping troops and warships in time of
war. 
1
The express purpose of the Declaration of Independence was to
establish independent status as part of the international community of
states.'2 The Constitution makes clear that it is the national government
that will function as part of that political community both in war and in
peace. The Constitution also expressly identifies the major elements of
the international system: it refers to kings, princes, foreign states 3 and
their ambassadors and public ministers as well as our own;14 it provides
for enforcing the law of nations;'" and it speaks not only of war' 6 and
declarations of war,' 7 but of international treaties,'8 alliances, confedera-
tions,19 agreements, and compacts.2 0
These extensive references to the international political and legal
order suggest at least one reason for Chancellor Kent's opinion that all
lawyers should study international law.2 ' Read both literally and in his-
torical context, the provisions of the Constitution dealing with war and
foreign affairs are appropriately viewed as a response to the international
order.
The Constitution can be understood as creating an internal political
and legal structure intended to function within the established interna-
tional political and legal order. Two celebrated opinions of Chief Justice
John Marshall illustrate this point. In The Schooner Exchange v.
McFadden2 2 he declined to permit an otherwise routine attachment of a
ship in an American port because "in practice, nations have not yet
asserted their jurisdiction over the public armed ships of a foreign sover-
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
12. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 23 (U.S. 1776).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 10.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 11; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, c.
1.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 11.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, c. 2; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, c.
1; U.S. CONST. art. VI, c. 2.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
20. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, c. 3.
21. JAMES KENT, I COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *19-*20.
22. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
[Vol. 50:129
1995] THE RELEVANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 131
eign entering a port open for their reception."23 In Murray v. The
Schooner Charming Betsy24 he wrote that "an act of congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains ....
The import of Chief Justice Marshall's reasoning in The Charming
Betsy is by no means limited to statutory interpretation. When dealing
with the Constitution the choice is not between ignoring that reasoning
or applying it fully to constitutional interpretation. If we presume, with
little or no intrinsic evidence in most cases, that Congress normally leg-
islates within the confines of the international system, then there is
ample reason at least to consider the requirements of that system when
interpreting a Constitution that expressly identifies major elements of
the system and establishes the framework for our interaction with it.
In pondering the implications of this view of our constitutional
order, it is important to make clear what is not being said. This view
does not rest on an assertion that our constitutional order, as a matter of
internal law, is subordinate to the international order. As a matter of
domestic law, a constitutional impediment to fulfillment of an interna-
tional legal obligation would have to be respected, even though interna-
tional law would not excuse a breach of the obligation on those grounds.
This view also does not rest on an assertion that our constitutional
order must yield to international realpolitik and concomitant demands
for efficiency. It is one thing to say that complex democracies must try
to find ways to deal with the tactical agility of more monolithic or
authoritarian states; it is quite another to say the democracies must
mimic them.
What this view means is that it is inappropriate to interpret the
Constitution on questions of foreign affairs and the use of force in inter-
national settings without reference to the international political and legal
system.
In order to achieve rational administration of the law, we must rec-
23. Id. at 144.
But in all respects different is the situation of a public armed ship. She
constitutes a part of the military force of her nation; acts under the immediate and
direct command of the sovereign; is employed by him in national objects. He has
many and powerful motives for preventing those objects from being defeated by the
interference of a foreign state. Such interference cannot take place without affecting
his power and his dignity. The implied license therefore under which such vessel
enters a friendly port, may reasonably be construed, and it seems to the Court, ought
to be construed, as containing an exemption from the jurisdiction of the sovereign,
within whose territory she claims the rites of hospitality.
Id.
24. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
25. Id. at 118.
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ognize that we are dealing with the interaction between two different
fields of law emanating from two different legal systems, namely the
constitutional law of the United States on the one hand, and the law and
structure of the international system on the other. In this, as in other
instances of interaction between different fields of law, retreat to hierar-
chical norms will not work well, if at all. The legal order is such that
both the Constitution and the basic principles and instruments of interna-
tional law are supreme in their own systems. When those systems inter-
sect, it is desirable to facilitate their interaction to the extent possible.
Interpreting the Constitution in a manner that impairs the United States'
ability to participate constructively in the international order is certainly
possible, and in some instances may be preferable, but that result should
not be reached without first considering the possibilities for
harmonization.
This does not mean that considerations relevant to the domestic
constitutional order invariably must yield to considerations relevant to
the international order. Both the opinion of the Court by Justice Harlan
and the dissenting opinion by Justice White in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino26 examine the nature and requirements of international law
and the international order as they bear upon the respective roles of the
executive and the judiciary in the United States. Justice Harlan ulti-
mately gives priority to internal structural considerations and empha-
sizes the constitutional underpinnings of the "act of state" doctrine.27
Justice White gives more weight to considerations relevant to the
international order, believing that
[t]o refuse inquiry into the question of whether norms of the interna-
tional community have been contravened by the act of state under
review would seem to deny the existence or purport of such norms, a
view that seems inconsistent with the role of international law in
ordering the relations between nations.2"
He would deal with the internal structural problem where necessary on a
case-by-case basis. Some may see the fact that Congress expressed its
26. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
27. The act of state doctrine does, however, have 'constitutional' underpinnings. It
arises out of the basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers. It concerns the competency of dissimilar institutions to make
and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of international relations.
The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign
acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of goals both for
itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the international sphere.
Id. at 423.
28. Id. at 457 (White, J., dissenting).
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essential agreement with Justice White29 as an affirmation that the needs
of the international order are relevant to the allocation of internal com-
petence with respect to international matters.
More broadly, Sabbatino demonstrates that considering the interna-
tional political and legal order does not necessarily lead to a particular
result on any given issue of allocating competence among the branches
of government. Like other judges before him, Justice Harlan's reason-
ing could have relied more heavily on judicial deference to territorial
sovereignty as an important value in the international legal order. In a
sense he was invoking that point when he argued that the "act of state"
doctrine protects international commerce by enhancing certainty and
predictability of title to goods in international trade.30 From that per-
spective, both Justices Harlan and White looked to the international
legal order to inform their approach to an internal structural issue
regarding allocation of competence. However, they reached different
conclusions regarding the needs of that order.
If that is so, then one might ask what difference it makes. The most
obvious response evinces our faith in rationality, namely the belief that
our chances of reaching a sound result are enhanced if we think about
the right things. But with regard to foreign affairs, and particularly the
use of force, there is a more specific response. The international order
has changed. That change poses profound questions about how to deal
with the interaction between the international system and our constitu-
tional order.
The framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended to estab-
lish a national government capable of exercising the rights and perform-
ing the obligations of states within the international system. The
Constitution contains ample references to the elements of that system as
it existed in the late 18th century. The drafters were preoccupied with
that system-one in which war was a lawful instrument of national pol-
icy. They could no more envisage the many changes that occurred in the
international system in the ensuing centuries than they could envisage
the many changes that occurred within the United States as it grew and
developed. But we can realize the framers' purpose only by ensuring
that the national government is capable of exercising the rights and per-
forming the obligations of states within the international system as it
exists today.
Since the end of World War II, and especially since the end of the
Cold War, constitutional interpretation with respect to the international
29. Congress partially "overruled" the "act of state" doctrine. Pub. L. No. 89-171, 79 Stat.
653 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)).
30. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 434-37.
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use of force requires careful consideration of the United Nations Char-
ter,3' its principles and purposes, its structure and implementation, and
its successes and failures. The goal is to seek ways to harmonize the
interaction between the domestic constitutional order and the interna-
tional order. The Charter would be consulted in this particular context
not, or at least not principally, because it is a treaty that the Constitution
declares to be the supreme law of the land, but because it is the supreme
instrument of the international legal order dealing with the use of force.
An examination of the Charter's text,32 and commentary of learned
scholars and judges, quickly reveals that international law regarding the
use of force has changed dramatically since the Constitution was
drafted. War, as the term was classically understood in international
law, is now widely considered illegal under the Charter 3 and interna-
tional law.34 In national governments, ministries of war have been
superseded by ministries of defense. The international rules of warfare
were extended to international armed conflict 35 and restyled "interna-
31. 15 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 335 (1945); 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).
32. In particular, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, I 3,4:
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such
a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
33. See Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 365,
365 (1953) ("War in the legal sense has been in large measure 'outlawed'; that is, the international
law conventionally accepted by most states no longer recognizes that large-scale hostilities may
constitute a 'state of war' in which the belligerents are legally equal."); Thomas M. Franck &
Faiza Patel, The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law: UN Police Action in
Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991) ("The United Nations
system is an elegant, carefully crafted instrument to make war illegal and unnecessary."); see also
Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 215-16 (June 27) (dissenting
opinion of Judge Oda).
Unlike some older principles of international law, the particular principle
concerning 'threat or use of force' emerged in parallel with the birth of the United
Nations towards the end of the Second World War, when the move to outlaw war in
general was successfully made .... The dual system of international law in time of
peace and international law in time of war was abandoned with the emergence of the
outlawry of war and the principle of non-intervention, which together with the
prohibition of the threat or use of force, came to encapsulate the founding spirit of
the United Nations.
Id.; see also Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force, 53 U. Cm. L.
REv. 113 (1986) (establishing that aggressive war is illegal as an effective rule of law in interna-
tional society).
34. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 99-100 (June 27).
35. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3115, 3116, art. 2, para. 1 ("In addition
to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the present Convention shall apply to
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
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tional humanitarian law."36
The Charter establishes a concept of collective security unknown to
the alliance structures of earlier periods. It also establishes a special
organ, the Security Council,37 authorized to provide security for all by
using a variety of means, including armed force, if it finds a threat to the
peace or a breach of the peace. 38 All member states, including the
offending state, are legally bound by decisions of the Security Council in
its exercise of these powers.39 The text of the Charter essentially limits
armed self-help by states to situations of individual or collective self-
defense in the event of armed attack.4" To that extent the Charter per-
mits the classic alliance system to continue.
The central distinguishing feature of collective security is a delega-
tion of authority to a diverse, influential, and reasonably representative
group of states, empowered by all states to decide on the community's
response to threats to the peace or breaches of the peace. The underly-
ing judgment, well known to municipal legal systems, is that breaches of
the peace constitute unacceptable conduct that threatens the security of
the community as a whole, and may require a forcible response.
The resemblance to classic alliances is superficial. Classic alli-
ances exist to deter outsiders, and rely on repeated tests of will and
skirmishes at the margins either to maintain or to change the existing
balance. The internal cohesion of the alliance may depend upon forceful
reactions to threats at its periphery that transcend the military signifi-
cance of those threats.
Collective security is designed to deter any misconduct on behalf of
all states. Since virtually all states are members of the United Nations,
the primary focus of collective security is internal, not external, to the
organization. It is by no means irrelevant that, in addition to its collec-
tive security powers, the Security Council is authorized to enforce judg-
ments of the International Court of Justice.4'
the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them."). This
article is common to all four Conventions of 1949.
36. Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1026 (3d ed. 1993) (citing HILAIRE
MCCOUBREY, INTERNATIONAL HUMANIrARIAN LAW 1 (1990)) ("McCoubrey defines international
humanitarian law as that which protects human beings during armed conflict; other writers have
used the term more broadly to refer to the entire legal regime for the regulation of war.").
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 7, 1.
38. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-42.
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 25 and 48; Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971
Montreal Convention Arising from Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3
(April 14); (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 114 (April 14) (Libyan request for provisional measures
denied in light of Security Council order to turn suspects over to the U.K. or U.S.).
40. U.N. CHARTER art. 5 1. This is subject to Security Council measures taken to deal with the
breach of the peace.
41. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, 2.
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The classic alliance system represents an approach to deterrence
rooted in self-help and mutual tests of power that municipal legal sys-
tems are designed to supplant and suppress wherever possible. Even
today, municipal legal systems may seek to justify their existence, and
their occasional harshness, as a preferable alternative to self-help and
clan warfare. It is not surprising that municipal legal systems tend to
view a system of international security rooted in self-help and military
alliances as more political than legal.
In collective security, on the other hand, municipal law encounters
at least the promising rudiments of what it recognizes as a law enforce-
ment system empowered by all to protect the security of all. If that
system is to function properly, then the domestic constitutional order of
member states must interact with it in ways appropriate to the goal of
collective security.
This does not mean that the practical needs of the collective secur-
ity system must always prevail over other values, any more than the
practical needs of local law enforcement must always prevail over other
municipal law values. But just as the great judicial decisions protecting
individual liberties within the context of domestic law enforcement con-
sider carefully the effects of the decisions on the functioning of the law
enforcement system, our constitutional analysis of internal allocations of
competence to deal with the international order also should consider
carefully the effects on the functioning of the collective security system.
Throughout much of the Cold War, the collective security system
was unable to function because the five permanent Security Council
members with individual veto power were locked in a struggle among
themselves and their rival alliances. Because of a Soviet walk-out, and
the failure to accord China's seat to the People's Republic, the Korean
conflict enjoyed the juridical cover of a United Nations "police action,"
in which the Truman Administration believed U.S. participation did not
require express congressional authorization. That reasoning strikes us as
artificial because in political terms the Korean conflict was a classic mil-
itary engagement between rival alliances that never in fact enjoyed the
community support implicit in collective security.
During the Cold War, the argument that the Charter created new
legal categories that the Constitution's provisions on war did not address
took on an air of formalism unrelated to the life-and-death struggle
between the West and its Communist adversaries. Particularly as seen
from the United States' perspective, it was the classic alliance structure
and traditional power politics, not the collective security system, that
maintained or restored peace during the Cold War. And it was Viet-
nam-an armed conflict that explicitly grew out of the alliance struc-
[Vol. 50:129
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ture, with no pretense of collective security-that stimulated the most
ambitious efforts to date to circumscribe the President's ability to com-
mit or use American armed forces.
With the end of the Cold War, the effective implementation of a
collective security system by the Security Council became possible to
imagine. That possibility was realized when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The
Security Council responded with an escalating series of measures culmi-
nating in the forcible expulsion of Iraqi forces by a Security-Council-
sanctioned coalition led by the United States.42 The collapse of respon-
sible government in Somalia led to mass starvation, the full horror of
which was averted by Security-Council sanctioned armed intervention
by the United States and others.43 When an oppressive military coup
d 'tat ousted the freely-elected President of Haiti, a Security-Council
sanctioned armed intervention by the United States and other countries
returned him to office."
These and other Security Council measures since the end of the
Cold War, the failure to achieve effective results in some places and the
deployment of U.S. peacekeeping forces in Bosnia have raised new legal
and political issues in the United States. The legality and wisdom of
placing U.S. forces under foreign command and operating under U.N.
political control are being questioned and debated.
Legislative proposals dealing with these issues are being introduced
in Congress, 45 which in turn reopens the debate about the allocation of
powers between the President and Congress. These new proposals
simultaneously raise and obscure a basic underlying point: it is time to
42. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932d mtg. at 26-27, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2932
(1990); S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg. at 54-55, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2933
(1990); S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2934 (1990);
S.C. Res. 664, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2937th mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2937 (1990); S.C. Res.
665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg. at 26, U.N. Doe. S/PV.2938 (1990); S.C. Res. 666, U.N.
SCOR, 45th Sess., 2939th mtg. at 37, U.N. Doe. S/PV.2939 (1990); S.C. Res. 667, U.N. SCOR,
45th Sess., 2940th mtg. at 28-30, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2940 (1990); S.C. Res. 669, U.N. SCOR, 45th
Sess., 2942d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2942 (1990); S.C. Res. 670, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
2943d mtg. at 26, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2943 (1990); S.C. Res. 674, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2951st
mtg. at 48, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2951 (1990); S.C. Res. 677, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2962d mtg. at
22, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2962 (1990); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 64-65,
U.N. Doc. S/PV.2963 (1990).
43. S.C. Res. 751, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3069th mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3069 (1992)
(approving a U.N. force to monitor a ceasefire and distribute food).
44. S.C. Res. 867, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3282nd mtg., U.N. Doe. S/PV.3282 (1993); S.C.
Res. 873, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3293rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3291 (1993) (imposing economic
sanctions on Haiti's military dictatorship); S.C. Res. 875, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3293d mtg. at
15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3293 (1993) (increasing sanctions).
45. See, e.g., S. 1803, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993) (Sen. Dole's proposal to amend the United
Nations Participation Act of 1945 to force the President to consult Congress before committing
troops to U.N. peacekeeping forces).
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examine the full implications for our domestic constitutional structure of
the changed international political and legal order established by the
U.N. Charter. And it is time to do so with an eye on our plans and hopes
for the future, not on the legal battles of the past.
In undertaking this reappraisal, we must recognize that the scope of
permissible self-help depends upon the practical alternatives. In decid-
ing whether to facilitate or restrain U.S. participation in collective secur-
ity, we are deciding whether to encourage or discourage the emergence
of a practical alternative to armed self-help and the alliance system.
And we cannot hide from the significance of that decision by taking
refuge in views of the Constitution formed in response to the alliance
system in general, and the Vietnam experience in particular.46
We must also recognize that discussing whether the congressional
power to declare war is a purely formal one that does not affect
undeclared wars may overlook a more general antecedent question.
That issue is whether the references to war in the Constitution should be
understood to refer to war in the international legal sense. If so, we face
a logical conundrum. As a matter of international law, war is now
widely regarded as illegal. Of course, it is possible to interpret the word
war differently in international law than in U.S. constitutional law. But
to interpret the word narrowly under international law in order to limit
the right of states to use force, and then to interpret it broadly under U.S.
constitutional law in order to limit the President's power to use force,
may suggest to some observers a triumph of political preference over
legal principle.
The Security Council's collective security powers are new and dif-
ferent from the right of a state or group of states to wage war under
classic international law. The former entails the use of force by those
the community authorizes to preserve its tranquility; the latter entails the
use of force between members of the community. The former is charac-
teristic of developed legal systems; those same systems generally pro-
hibit the latter.
The framers of the Constitution may have contemplated classic mil-
itary alliances, but they did not contemplate U.S. participation in a col-
lective security mechanism such as the U.N. Security Council, where
even large-scale international military actions take on the juridical (and
now political) character of law enforcement by a universal, organized
46. Reasonably enough given the context and materials available when he undertook his
work, Professor John Ely's extraordinary scholarship and analysis emphasize the issues posed by
the alliance system in general and the Cold War and Vietnam experiences in particular . JOHN H.
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1993). I would emphasize the new issues posed by the emergence, however haltingly, of a real
collective security system since the end of the Cold War.
[Vol. 50:129
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community of states. That of course does not mean the Constitution
does not determine the allocation of competence with respect to U.S.
participation in the system. The United States approved the Charter by
the constitutional procedure for making treaties. The U.S. representative
to the United Nations is appointed by the constitutional procedure for
naming U.S. officers and ambassadors. Budgetary obligations under the
Charter are met by the constitutional procedure for appropriations.
But the constitutional allocation of competence with respect to the
use of armed force is less certain. The question is which category of
competencies for the international use of armed force applies to U.S.
participation in missions sanctioned by the Security Council: the cate-
gory that permits the President to act alone, or the category that requires
congressional action.
In analyzing this question, lawyers will resort to all of the tradi-
tional tools of constitutional interpretation. My basic point is that they
also must consider the operation of the international political and legal
order in choosing among alternative constitutional interpretations. This,
in turn, requires a closer look at the United Nations Charter and the
Security Council as instruments of collective security.
The Charter envisages the Security Council directly implementing
the collective security system through the use of armed forces made
available to the Council by prior agreement.47 However, no state has
concluded such an agreement with the Security Council under article 43,
and current prospects for assembling a significant force through these
agreements are not bright. Accordingly, the collective security system
depends upon the willingness of individual member states to participate
in particular missions. This situation is likely to continue.
The effectiveness of this system depends especially on the role of
the United States, and thus on its constitutional order, particularly in a
negative sense. As a legal matter, the United States can veto U.N.
Security Council decisions. As a military matter, large-scale naval or
military operations are likely to rely on U.S. participation. As an eco-
nomic matter, the financing of collective security is dependent upon the
principal financial contributors, of which the United States is the largest.
As a political matter, the collective security system substantially
depends upon the leadership of the United States.
The Security Council's function is to deter aggressive behavior.
The effectiveness of that deterrence, indeed the effectiveness of any
response to actual aggression, may depend on the speed and plausibility
of a forceful reaction. Requiring congressional approval to commit U.S.
47. U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
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forces each time the Security Council decides to use force may impair
the effectiveness of the Security Council by delaying its forceful reac-
tion. This, in turn, may impair the credibility of any prior Security
Council warnings or orders that the United States supported. Requiring
congressional approval on a case-by-case basis also may stimulate other
governments, including those with constitutions modeled on our own, to
take the position that they, too, will require parliamentary approval
before committing forces in support of a Security Council mission.48
This could even further weaken the credibility of Security Council warn-
ings and orders and the speed and effectiveness of forceful reactions.
Requiring case-by-case parliamentary approval would effectively con-
vert the Security Council from a decision-making organ into a diplo-
matic conference authorized to propose agreements for formal approval
by member governments and their parliaments.
In the case of Kuwait, President George Bush received formal Con-
gressional support after employing U.S. naval forces to enforce the
Security Council's economic embargo, but before engaging Iraqi forces
on the ground. But President Bush never conceded that he needed such
support or would refrain from going ahead without it. Had he conceded
those points, it is likely that assembling the international coalition before
the congressional vote would have proved more difficult. That, in turn,
might have made Congress less likely to support the mission.
One possible response to this argument is: "Good. That keeps us
out of war, at least absent a really compelling reason." Both parts of that
response should be unsatisfying.
Law enforcement organs, including the United Nations Security
Council, frequently must rely on the credible threat of a forcible
response to deter unlawful activity. There is historical evidence to sup-
port the proposition that aggressors who are not stopped relatively early
may have to be stopped later at much greater cost. Either waiting for the
development of a sufficiently compelling political environment to ensure
decisive parliamentary action, or manipulating events to stimulate the
development of such an environment, could prove to be very costly.
Moreover, national parliaments do not necessarily provide the only
or the most effective protection against rash and ill-considered behav-
ior.49 The need for persuasion, and presumably for reasoned debate,
48. See Lori F. Damrosch, Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A Common Core of
Accountability in Democratic Societies?, 50 U. Miami L. Rev. 181, 183 & n. 7 (1995).
49. The members of parliament may even provoke such behavior. Professor Edwin Cohen
reports his impression that, during a visit with President Lyndon Johnson at the white House
shortly after the Tonkin Gulf incident in 1964, "the President was most concerned about political
support for the upcoming [presidential] campaign, especially to counter Senator Goldwater's
criticism [of his caution regarding Vietnam], and not about any worries that he may have lacked
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inheres in all requirements for collective decision-making, including
those of the U.N. Charter. The Security Council's membership and vot-
ing rules are designed to render a decision to use force unlikely absent
fairly widespread support, including that of the major powers.50  The
Security Council has shown no inclination to take the decision to use
force lightly, or to act as a rubber stamp for the whims of the White
House.
For those who recognize that case-by-case congressional review
could impair the operation of the collective security system, and who
believe that this result is undesirable, there are two options. Both envis-
age presidential flexibility exercised in consultation with congressional
leaders. The first option is to interpret the Constitution either alone, or
in conjunction with the U.N. Charter, as authorizing the President to use
force sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council, at least in situations
where case-by-case congressional review would impair the collective
security system. The second option is for Congress to enact a general
statute authorizing the President to use force sanctioned by the U.N.
Security Council,5 thereby accommodating the needs of the collective
security system with the view that the Constitution requires congres-
sional approval to commit armed forces. 2 A possible middle ground
presidential authority for his actions" in the Gulf. Referring to Sen. Goldwater, the President
asked, "What does he want me to do, drop an atomic bomb on a bunch of Chinese junks?" EDWIN
S. COHEN, A LAWYER'S LIFE: DEEP IN THE HEART OF TAXES 319-20 (1994).
50. Decisions of the Security Council to use of force require an affirmative vote of nine of the
fifteen members, provided none of the five permanent members objects. U.N. CHARTER art. 27,
3.
51. Thomas Franck offers a possible solution through a reform of the War Powers Resolution
which enumerates the circumstances in which the President may deploy armed forces on his own
authority:
The first object of Congress in revising the War Powers Resolution must therefore
be to establish in law its view of when the President may use the armed forces
without its consent. These circumstances should be (1) to repel an armed attack or
imminent attack on the United States or its armed forces, (2) to effect the speedy and
safe evacuation of U.S. citizens from the high seas or foreign territory if the
government of a ship's flag or of a territory is unable to provide the requisite
standard of protection for Americans required by international law, and (3) to permit
the President to respond to a resolution of the UN Security Council under chapter
VII of the Charter (citation omitted).
Thomas M. Franck, Rethinking War Powers: By Law or By "Thaumaturgic Invocation?," 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 766, 772 (1989).
52. Both options refer generally to the use of force sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council.
No distinction is made in this regard among decisions of the Security Council under articles 41, 42
or 51. The object of this analysis is, as the word "sanctioned" implies, a use of force affirmatively
authorized, approved, or invited by the Security Council. In this connection, it is important to
consider the implications of the distinction between an obligation and a right to use force drawn
by Louis Henkin in his comment on this paper. Louis Henkin, War Powers "Short of War, " 50 U.
MiAMi L. REV. 201, 206-07 (1995). Insofar as Professor Henkin seeks to exclude the use of force
not affirmatively sanctioned by the Security Council from an analytical framework designed to
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would be to treat the conclusion reached under the first option as a rule
of federal common law. 3
Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense
William Perry pointed out that the possibility of unilateral U.S. action in
response to a crisis could help persuade others that collective action is
desirable. 4 For similar reasons, a good statute regulating the Presi-
dent's use of force is unlikely to emerge unless Congress believes that
unilateral Presidential action is a plausible alternative, and not clearly
illegal.
Those who support a statutory solution to this problem must control
their impulses to dismiss the first option. Otherwise, they will
encourage Congress to enact an unduly stingy statute. Congressional
fear that a statute could be hard to repeal may, in and of itself, encourage
unduly circumscribed descriptions of Presidential powers. And a bad
statute either will be circumvented in practice-as with the War Powers
Resolution5--or it will frustrate the Security Council's effective imple-
mentation of the collective security system.
respond to the collective security functions of the Security Council. I fully accept the distinction.
But it is not practical to extend the distinction to an obligation to use force under the relevant
decision of the Security Council. As John Ely acknowledges in War and Responsibility,
agreements under articles 43 and 45 of the Charter neither exist nor are likely at least in the near
future. ELY, supra note 46, at 151 n.60. In their absence, whatever the authority of the Security
Council to oblige member states to use or make available national armed forces (a matter that is
not free from doubt), the Council has, as a practical matter, resorted to authorizing, approving or
inviting rather than requiring the use of force. A domestic constitutional analysis limited to uses
of force expressly required by the Security Council or article 43 agreements would be without
practical object. It also would avoid the very point of the exercise, namely analyzing the
implications for the constitutional allocation of competence between the President and the
Congress of the collective security system as it operates today and might be expected to develop,
not as it operated during the Cold War, when it was subordinated to the alliance system, and not as
it might flourish in some alternative, hypothetical world under article 43 agreements. If Professor
Henkin seeks a legal obligation on which to anchor the interpretive methodology, then I would
look for it not in the words of the Security Council resolutions, but in the general provisions of the
Charter, including in particular Article 24, paragraph 1 and Article 25. The essence of my
position is that these provisions require affirmative support by all members of the community for a
functioning collective security system administered by the Security Council, and that the
obligation to afford such support should inform sound constitutional interpretation by all
competent organs of all member states, including their courts.
53. Inspired by Justice Harlan's analysis in Sabbatino and borrowing from Justice Gray's
analysis in The Paquette Habana, the conclusion would be rooted in the Constitution and the U.N.
Charter, and designed to harmonize the constitutional order with the international order "where
there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision" to the
contrary. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), The Paquette Habana, 175
U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
54. Warren Christopher & William J. Perry, Foreign Policy, Hamstrung, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
13, 1995, at A19.
55. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988)); see
also Michael J. Glennon, Too Far Apart: Repeal the War Powers Resolution, 50 U. Miami L.
Rev. 17 (1995).
[Vol. 50:129
1995] THE RELEVANCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 143
The latter result would be very sad. History suggests that the alter-
native to an effective system of collective security is not peace, but war
in the classic sense.
